Design stage: there is no released app yet. This site separates what exists in the repository from what is planned. See status

Hardware, platform and safety

Security and privacy

Security and privacy themes in the Simca design: local-first data, no telemetry, roles, audit, backups. Design intent on

Status labels: Built in the repository (checked files or tested library code; not a product you can run yet) Designed in a document, no code yet Planned: listed in the catalog, not built Not decided Not in the catalog yet (a gap) No claim made

What goes wrong with “Local-first data” in a shop, in particular regarding lost device?

Designed C0184

Data lives on the shop's own devices by default; nothing requires a cloud account. This is a design principle in the README. Plan for: lost device; shared device; backup location. It is designed in a document and no code exists.

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How risky is “No telemetry” to get wrong, especially around crash reports?

Designed C0185

The README states no telemetry or data collection. Code-level guards exist in the repository (no network crates, no demo keys, no remote assets, no default network binding), but they cannot prove a future app. The launcher's one disclosed opening request is the stated exception and carries no account data. Plan for: crash reports; the opening request reveals a network address; optional features that need a network. It is designed in a document and no code exists.

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Which edge cases come up around “Roles and permissions”, especially around shared logins?

Planned C0186

Giving cashiers, supervisors and owners different rights, and limiting risky actions. Plan for: shared logins; temporary permissions; owner lockout. In the catalog it is a plan; no screen or product is built.

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What should I plan for with “Audit trail”, in particular regarding clock changes?

Planned C0187

An append-only record of edits, voids, discounts and logins is planned. Separately, a tamper-evident, hash-chained log of removal decisions exists as tested code: it is local, sent to nobody, and detects edited or deleted entries, but someone who rewrites the whole chain could change it. Plan for: clock changes; log size; deleting the log. In the catalog it is a plan; no screen or product is built.

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Is “Encryption at rest” supported today, considering key storage?

Not decided C0188

Protecting the database file on a lost device. The core has no encryption at rest today; whether to adopt SQLCipher is an open decision that weighs key loss against theft. Plan for: key storage; performance; recovery if a key is lost. It is not decided.

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How does Simca approach “Backups”, with a focus on untested backups?

Planned C0189

Local backups to drives or another device, with restore tests. Plan for: untested backups; backup of a corrupt file; offsite copy. In the catalog it is a plan; no screen or product is built.

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Is “Restore” supported today, considering version mismatch?

Planned C0190

Rebuilding a device from a backup, checking integrity first. Plan for: version mismatch; partial restore; restoring over newer data. In the catalog it is a plan; no screen or product is built.

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Is “Device pairing” supported today, in particular regarding unknown device?

Planned C0191

Trusting a second device on the shop network. Plan for: unknown device; revoking a lost phone; time sync. In the catalog it is a plan; no screen or product is built.

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Where does “Signed files” fit in Simca, with a focus on key ceremony not done?

Built (repo) C0192

Everything the launcher installs is signed: packages, update manifests, entitlements, the catalog snapshot and price documents. A missing signature or an empty checksum is an error, never skipped. Ed25519 is used in the packaging code with test keys only; no production key exists in the repository and the key ceremony is not done. A revocation list and a trusted key set exist as code. Plan for: key ceremony not done; key loss; revocation travels with launcher updates. It exists only as a file in the repository, not as a product feature.

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What goes wrong with “Data minimisation” in a shop, especially around customer id thresholds?

Planned C0193

Only collecting what the sale needs, with customers' details optional. Plan for: customer id thresholds; export requests; retention. In the catalog it is a plan; no screen or product is built.

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Where does “PINs and sessions” fit in Simca, in particular regarding shoulder surfing?

Planned C0194

Quick staff logins that time out safely. Plan for: shoulder surfing; shared pin; lock on idle. In the catalog it is a plan; no screen or product is built.

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Why does “Secure updates” matter for a small business, with a focus on failed update?

Built (repo) C0195

Updating without a mandatory internet connection, with rollback. In the launcher library: a signed manifest with expiry and a rollback-protection sequence, a mandatory checksum, a list of blocked versions, staged download then rename, successor files (the running program is never overwritten), real rollback to a previous generation and automatic rollback after a failed first start, and install from a signed file. Tested with a mock fetcher; the HTTP fetcher and screens are not built. Plan for: failed update; offline update media; no http fetcher yet. It exists only as a file in the repository, not as a product feature.

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Why does “Software supply chain” matter for a small business, considering dependency vulnerabilities?

Designed C0196

Building and signing releases and checking dependencies. A process plan in the repo, not a result. Plan for: dependency vulnerabilities; reproducible builds; signing keys. It is designed in a document and no code exists.

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What should owners check about “Security model and threat model”, in particular regarding external review not done?

Designed C0197

A written security model exists in the repository: assets, attackers, eight rules (true removal, signed everything, local authority for offline use only, online features decided by the host, no hidden doors, staging discipline, break-in tests, an honest limit) and a table of what is built and what is not. A full threat model, an external security review and the host design are planned. Plan for: external review not done; host not built; a person who holds the code can attack the code. It is designed in a document and no code exists.

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What should I plan for with “True removal of unselected elements”, with a focus on a removed element's data is a separate choice?

Built (repo) C0198

A package holds nothing for elements outside its spec: no code, assets, migrations or data tables, and hiding by a flag does not count. A packaging command proves the absence of files, menu entries, permissions and database tables for a profile, and the core tests check the database side. Plan for: a removed element's data is a separate choice; proven per profile, not for every possible spec; installer behaviour not tested. It exists only as a file in the repository, not as a product feature.

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Why does “No hidden doors” matter for a small business, especially around applies to the code that exists?

Built (repo) C0199

Rules enforced by tests: no demo or default keys, no default network binding, no runtime CDN or remote asset loads, no founder or vendor accounts, no auto-start, and no hidden start path. Source scans run in all four workspaces. Plan for: applies to the code that exists; the flutter interface is not built; a person with the code can attack the code. It exists only as a file in the repository, not as a product feature.

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Which edge cases come up around “Staging discipline”, thinking about rollout tooling not built?

Designed C0200

Release rules from the security model: snapshots first, data never moves with code, a backup before any data-touching change, test on a copy, one stage per release, the previous build kept for real rollback, and ledger and customer data last. Parts exist as code (test on a copy, verified backup before removal); the rollout tooling does not. Plan for: rollout tooling not built; installer that leaves the data folder alone not proven; sensitive modules last. It is designed in a document and no code exists.

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What goes wrong with “Removal audit chain” in a shop, considering someone who recomputes the whole chain can rewrite history?

Built (repo) C0201

Each removal decision is written to a local log in which every entry commits to the previous one, and the current state is cross-checked against the chain. It is tamper-evident, not tamper-proof; publishing the head hash outside the computer (for example in a printed or exported record) is a planned mitigation. Plan for: someone who recomputes the whole chain can rewrite history; no trusted time offline; local only. It exists only as a file in the repository, not as a product feature.

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